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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
R.A Y D.

\YILLIA~IS, ~-\.

e.

~IlXER,

~fl~L\. THO~L\S, IL~-\ THO:JI)~;-.;

LA:JIBERT, P. P. T H 0 :JI AS,
~IAX TIIO~IA::-;, JOSEPH HAXSOX, ROLAXD J. HAXSON and
ROY H~-\XSON, partners under the
name of ELBERTA LAND AND
\VATER CO~IPANY,
Plaintiffs and AppeUants
vs.
OREN E. B--:\.RXEY and THEL~IA
BARNEY, his wife. THE BANK
OF SPANISH FORK, a corporation; and UTAH COUNTY, a body
politic and corporate of the State
of UTAH,
Defendants ·and Respondents.

Case
No. 7336

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS
AND APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs are partners doing business as the
Elberta Land and Water Company succeeding a former
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partnership of the same name which had included Charles
T. Dixon and A. T. Money but did not include plaintiffs
Mirna Thomas and Roy Hanson. Plaintiffs sue to quiet
title to certain lands situated in Utah County. The answering defendants Oren E. Barney and Thelma Barney,
his wife, by their answer disclaim as to all of the property
except the following:
East one-half of the East one-half and the
Northwest Quarter of the Northeast Quarter of
Section 6, Township 11 South, Range 1 West, Salt
Lake }f eridian.
On the land described above, the answering defendants denied the claims of title and poss·ession or right
of possession of the plaintiffs and counterclaim in two
causes of action to have title quieted in said answering
defendants.
The plaintiffs received their title from the following
sources:
a. From Lewis Thompson and wife to Utah Valley
Land and Water Company by deed (plaintiffs' Exhibit
"C") dated February 26, 1920 (no question was raised
as to the right of the grantors in Exhibit '' C'' to pass
good title and no question with regard to the title· antedating the said Exhibit was presented).
b. Certificate of Sale under foreclosure by the First
Security Bank of Provo (plaintiffs' Exhibit "D")
against Utah Valley Land and Water Company, et al,
dated November 21, 1933.
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e. As~ign1nent of the foregoing certificate by the
bank to the Colorado DeYelopinent Company, a corporation (plaintiffs' Exhibit "E ") dated August 3, 1934.

d. Sheriff's Deed to Colorado Development Company, a corporation, (plaintiffs' Exhibit "F") dated
Augn~t 16, 1934.
e. Quitclaim Deed (plaintiffs' Exhibit "G") from
Colorado Development Company, a corporation, to 0. A.
Penrod dated November 27,1937.
f. Quitclailn Deed (plaintiffs' Exhibit "H") from
0. A. Penrod and wife to the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork dated January 11, 1938, and recorded on December 29, 1944, in the office of the County Recorder of Utah
County, Utah.
g. Quitclaim Deed (plaintiffs' Exhibit "I") from
P. P. Thomas and :Mirna Thomas, his wife, Joseph Hanson, widower, and the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork
to Elberta Land and Water Company, a partnership, the
plaintiff herein, dated l\farch 29, 1945, and recorded on
March 29, 1945, in the office of the County Recorder of
Utah County, Utah.
The answering defendants Oren E. Barney and Thelma Barney claim the land by virtue of Auditor's Tax

Deed (defendant's Exhibit 3) and quitclaim deeds dated
November 3, 1941 from Utah County, (defendants' Exhibits 1 and 2), which deeds the defendants admitted were
invalid because of the failure to advertise the May sale
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for the required twenty-eight days and the ahRence of
the affidavit from the tax rolls. (T. 77-78).
The defendants pleaded two further affirmative defenses and counter-claims which they maintained prevented the plaintiffs from asserting title as against the
defendant and which they claimed would require the
court to quiet title in defendants.
The first cause of counterelaim alleges that the iands
in issue were conveyed to 0. A. Penrod by the Colorado
Development Company by quit claim deed upon Penrod's
payment to it of $2500, which sum, or the greater part
thereof, was supplied to him by the Commercial Bank of
Spanish Fork by and through P. P. Thomas, one of the
piaintiffs, and that on or about December 8, 1937, P. P.
Thomas and 0. A. Penrod advised the users of water of
the old Utah Valley Land & Water Company, which included these defendants, that if they, 'the users, would
repay the $2500 advanced by the Commercial Bank of
Spanish Fork, that they could have the property purchased by Penrod from the Colorado Development Com. pany, and that assessments were levied against the water
users from which the bank was paid in full, and thereupon the defendants, with the other water users, became
entitled to the purchases made by Penrod including the
described lands. That rut that time the lands had been
sold to Utah County for taxes, and that thereafter 0. A.
Penrod purchased some of the same lands from Utah
County, and that under these facts, the plaintiffs now
have no equitabie right to claim the lands in issue.
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The serond eause of eonnterrlaim set~ up that prior
to the purchase of the land~ frmn the Colorado Development Con1pany 0. ~~. Penrod was a. Inember of a. committee of resident::; of Elberta, Utah, and 8Urrounding territory, to inYestip;a te the possibilities of acquiring the
water rights of the Utah Yalley Land & Water Company,
and the land of the Colorado Developn1ent Company,
"·hich was for1nerly irrigated by such water, and as such
obtained an option to purchas·e, and thereafter did acquire all of the "·ater rights of the Utah Valley Land &
"'ater Company and certain of the lands held by the Colorado Development Company, all of which had previously
been sold to Utah County for delinquent taxes. Some of
the land purchased by Penrod had not previously been,
and no ,,·ater could be supplied from the system as it wa~
constructed. That Penrod, with the financial help of P.
P. Thomas, as president of the Commercial Bank of
Spanish Fork, purchased from U·tah County much of the
land that had been formerly irrigated by the sys t:em conveyed to Penrod by the Utah Valley Land & Water Company, and that thereafter, on or about June 3, 1940, while
he was still record owner of the lands in question here,
and at a meeting with the County Commission of Utah
County, Penrod informed a committee of the land owners
that he and his associates had bought all the land they
wanted from Utah County and that the people living in
and about Elberta could go ahead and buy from the
1

county the balance of the land that had been sold to him
h~· the Colorado Development Company and which had
been sold to Utah County for delinquent taxes. That in
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reliance upon the statement and representation of Penrod, defendants purchased the land in issue here under
a contract from the county, and upon completion of payment received the county's deeds, and that now the plaintiffs as remote grantees from Penrod are estopped from
asserting any claim to the property, or that the tax procedure under which defendants purchased was invalid.
The plaintiffs pres·ented their documentary evidence
through exhibits by stipulations of the parties and then
rested. The defendants then put on evidence both by documents and oral testimony. At the conclusion of defendants' testimony and after def·endants rested, plaintiffs
moved the court for an order dismissing the affirmative
answers and counter-claims of the def·endants and for
judgment on the complaint (T. 75-76) which motion the
court denied.
The court found that the plaintiffs were not bonafide
purchas·ers without notice and for value of the land in
issue and were estopped to set up the claim that the quitclaim deeds from Utah County conveying the land to the
defendants are invalid and that the plaintiffs and each
of them are estopped to claim the land involved in this
action. The court thereupon entered it~ decree in favor
of the defendants and against the plain tiffs and decreed
1

that the defendants Or,en E. Barney ·and Thelma Barney,
his wife, are

~tne

own·ers of the property in controversy

and quieting title in said property in said defendants.
Defendants we~e awarded costs in the action.
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Frmn the judg1uent of the District Court plaintiffs

appeal.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
1. The court erred in denying plaintiffs' motion
for a dis1nissal of defendants' counter-claims and for
judg1nent in favor of plaintiffs.
2. The Findings of Fact (R. 51-55) are not supported by the evidence.
3. The Findings of Fact (R. 51-55) do not support
the Conclusions of Law (R. 5'5-56).
4. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
are insufficient to support the Decr'e'e (R. 57-58).
5. The court erred in admitting hearsay testimony
and other inadmissible evidence on the part of the defendants over objections of the plaintiffs.

POINTS FOR ARGUMENT
It is believed that the errors assigned can be best consolidated and covered in argument under the following
headings:

I.
The plairntijfs evidence established im them a good title
and there was no competent evidence sufficient tlo
defe~at such title.
(a) The evidence perrrditted to be imtroduced by defen-

dants bo OJtltack pZOJintiffs' title was inadmissable and
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incom·petent und,er the st,atute of frauds, Sections
33-5-1 and 33-5-3, Utah Code Annotat,ed, 1943, and
wa,,· further inadmissable as being ltearsa.y.

II.
The findings of

~act ~are

not suppo'rted by the evide,nce.

III.
The findings of 'fact do no't
Law orr the Decree.

suppo~rt

the f'Onclusions

~of

III. (a)
There was wo competent evidence sufficienJt to raise an estoppel in defenwants' favo'r (JJYl,d to t1vus prevent
plaintiffs from asserting cZaim to the subject property or to estop plaintiffs from att·acking the validity :of defendants' title.
1

ARGUMENT
1.

The plairntiffs evidence establtished im them a good #itle
and there 'toas no competent evidenCie sufficient to
defeat such title.

There can be no doubt, nor have defendants ever
questioned, that the ins'truments introduced by plaintiffs
in support of plaintiffs' title we:ve amp:le and sufficient
to establish title in them unless for some reason they were
estopped from asserting their ti!tlle. This was recognized
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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hy the rourt in it~ menwrandun1 opinion. (Record 38).
Tlw record and plaintiffB' exhibits "C,'' "D," "E,"
"F," dG,'' '"H," and "I" speak for themselves and
dearly estahli~h in the plaintiffs' a good title to the
property. It is belieYed that no argument need be made
with regard to this particular phase of the case, except
a~ coYered under o'ther headings herein.
I (a).

The eridence permi.tted to be in,troduced by the defendants to attack plaintiffs' title was inadmiss·able and
incompetent under the sbalute of frauds, 'Sections
33-5-1 and 33-5-3, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and
u·as further inadmissable as being he,arsay.
During the course of the trial the defendants were
permitted to introduce evidence and testimony at various
times with regard to conversations had by the defendants
with persons other than the plaintiffs, or any of them,
and outside the presence of the plaintiffs, or any of them.
(T. 37-39, -1-7, 65).
Testimony was permitted to be given by Va:leria
Bauer that at a meeting of county commissioners on June
3, 1940, attended by s·everal persons, not including any
party to this action, 0. A. Penrod stated that he and his
partners had all the land they now desired. (T. 37-39).
Exeerpts from the minutes of such meeting were also
permitted to be introduced. (T. 47). Earl Barney (the
father of the defendant Oren E. Barney) was ::P·resent
at such meeting and was permitted to testify concerning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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conversations and happenings there. ( T. 50). Later the
defendant Oren E. Barney was permitted to testify concerning statements his father made to him as to conversations a t said meeting. (T. 65-67).
1

As above stated, at no time was any party to this
action present at any such meeting or when any such
conversations allegedly took place. Clearly such testimony was inad1nissable as hearsay and cannot in any way
bind these plaintiffs. True in several instances in connection with the admission of such testimony, and in fact
other very questionable testimony, the court indicated that
the admissibility of .such testimony was questionable but
stated that inasmuch as the case was being tried befor·e a
judge rather than before a jury it was deemed such testimony would be r·eceived "pro forma" for what it was
worth and if he did not la:t1er think it was admissable or
competent or relative he would disregard it. In that connection, while we appreciate the fact that courts are often
more leni·ent with the admissibility of evidence in a matter being tried before a judge without a jury, it seems
to us that in this case such procedure was carried far
beyond the realms of legal propriety. We submit that
judges are only human and when a judge, r·egardless of
his honesty or integrity or his confidence in his own ability to separate the wheat from the chaff, permits indiscriminately the admissibility of all kinds of testimony,
whether relevant or otherwise but which may, if considered, be persuasive, that such judge no matter how he
may try does not and cannot erase from his mind the
effect of such testimony; and where, as here, such an
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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abundance of testinwny wa~ ad1nitted in such a way it
~eems to us that it wa~ prejudicial PlTor to do so.
During the course of the trial testilnony was permitted to be introduced concerning promises allegedly
made by one 0. A. Penrod, the renwte grantor of the
plaintiff~.

at a 1neeting attended by a group of residents

of Elberta and Yicinity, (of which group the defendants
were not 1nen1bers) to the effect that if certain payments
were made by the group of water users attending such
meeting that such water users could have the property
purchased by Penrod fron1 the Colorado Development
Company ("which included the subject property). It was
alleged that P. P. Thomas was present at such meeting
and acquiesced in the statements of Penrod, P. P. Thomas
then and there being president of the Commercial Bank
of Spanish Fork, which had advanced money with which
Penrod purchased said property. Under any theory if
such promises were made they were nothing more than
verbal promises to transfer an interest in real property
in the event certain things were done by the water users
who attended the meeting. Clearly those oral statements
and agreements, if in fact made, fall wi'thin the statute
of frauds and were not admissible or competent to establish any agreem·ent or understanding with regard to
the transfer or promises to transfer an interest in the
real property in question. (See Sections 33-5-1 and 33-5-3,
Utah Ood.e Annotated, 1943.).
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II.
The findilngs

~of

fa·ct are not su.pp,orted by the evidence.

Under Finding No. 15 the court, in addition to other
things, found: ''That 0. A. Penrod aided defendants in
making their s·election of the land purchased by defendants from Utah County." There is not one word of
evidence in the entire record to support this finding. In
fact there is no eviden0e that the defendants ever talked
with or had any dealings with 0. A. Penrod as to this
property. All of the evidence is 'to the contrary. Neither
of the defendants were present at the meeting with the
commissioners on June 3, 1940. Perhaps the court became confused because there was a man named ''Barney''
who was preS'ent at that meeting but that was the father
of the defendant, namely: Earl Barney..(T. 37-39 and 50).
The defendant Oren Barney's testimony is to the effect
that his wife and father accompanied him to the county
commission's office when he made his selection of the
land which he ·purchased ( T. 64) and nowhere is it indicated that Penrod or any of the defendants had anything to do with such selection or were present when it
was made.
Under Finding of Fact No. 17 the court found:
''That the plaintiffs had notice of defendants'
claim of title through P. P. Thomas, Max 'Thomas
and Joseph Hanson. ''
There is absolutely nothing in the ·evidence to support
such a finding. Nowhere can any evidence he found which
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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would show that P. P. Thmnas or ~lax Thmnas or Joseph
Han~on had at any tilne prior to the tin1e the property
wa~ transferred to plaintiff~ or even at any time prior
to the con1n1ence1nent of the action known of the representations and actions ,~vhich are attributable to 0. A.
Penrod on June 3, 19-!0. X o one ever testified that Penrod or anyone advised the plaintiffs, or any of them, or
anyone acting for them as to such statements or activities of Penrod nor is there any evidence wha:tsoever to
show that at the time the plaintiffs or their immediate
grantors received the deed to the property in question
that plaintiffs had any notice at all of the claim of the
defendants.
Under Finding No. 18 the court found as follows:
•' That P. P. Thomas had knowledge of the
facts constituting equitable estoppel in favor of
defendants at the time the Commercial Bank of
Spanish Fork, P. P. Thomas and wife and Joseph
Hanson conveyed the property in issue to plaintiff as partners.''
As will be hereinafter pointed out it is our contention
that Finding No. 18 is not in any respect a finding of
fact but is entirely a conclusion of law. This matter,
however, will be covered in another part of the argument.
In connection with such finding, however, it should be
stated that there is absolutely no competent evidence
to support the finding made. Because of the ambiguity
of the finding as to just what facts ''constituting an
equitable estoppel" are referred to, it is difficult to meet
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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this 1natter· squarely. However, for purposes of this part
of the argument, we must assume that the court referred
to the representations and statements attributed to 0. A.
Penrod and to his alleged activities in connection therewith
on June 3, 1940 when it is contended that Penrod stated
that he and his ''partners'' or ''workers'' had purchased
all the land they wanted. With regard to suchm·atterthe record is absolutely void of any evidence whatsoever indicating that P. P. Thomas knew of the supposed representations or statements or conduct of Penrod. If Penrod in fact
made such statements there is nothing in the record to
show who was referred to by ''his partners'' or ''workers'' or to show that any of the defendants were included
or intended by him to be included therein. Even if Penrod had expressly mentioned the plaintiffs or any of them
as being his "partners" or "workers," such declaration
hy him would not be competent to establish such relationship. There is no evidence that P. P. 'Thomas or any of
the plaintiffs or their immediate grantors acquiesced in
or joined Penrod in connection with such statements or
agreed or intended to be bound by such statements or
actions by Penrod. There is nothing to show that dealings previously had by P. P. Thomas and Thomas' associates with Penrod were such that Penrod represented
them or was in any way in a position to speak for them
or that Penrod was bound to or that he did convey to
Thomas or his associates any information as to the representations which he may have made to the defendants,
and certainly there is nothing to show that any of the
defendants were ''partners'' or ''workers'' of Penrod.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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EYen. therefore. if P. P. Thomas knew of these repreat the time of the transfer of the property to
the plaintiff~ ~ueh representations were in no way binding upon Thon1as or any of tl1e plaintiffs. They were all
made after title had been transferred from Penrod and
he was in no position to speak for or bind any person
having title to the property and particularly in no position to bind the plaintiffs or their immediate grantors.
sentation~

F nder Fnding No. 19 the court finds:
''That plaintiffs are not bona fide purchasers
without notice and for value of the land in issue
and are estopped to set up the claim that the quit
claim deeds from Utah County, conveying the land
to defendants, are not valid against plaintiffs.''
'Vith regard to such finding and particularly the finding
that the plaintiffs were not purchasers for value it is
interesting to note the statement of the court in his memorandunl decision (T. 47) to the effect that: "The evidence disclosing a recited consideration merely, with no
value paid, the plaintiffg who may not have had notice of
the defendants' claim are still not proteeted against
the equity.'' Where in the evidence is there anything
from which it can be concluded that "there was no value·
paid''~ The deeds to the plaintiffs and their predecessors
all recite a conside-ration. There is nothing to show that
such consideration was not in fact paid and the rule certainly is that where a consideration is recited it is presumed to have been paid. The defendants did not introdue(' any evidence to refute such presumption and we
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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must presume that a valuable consideration was paid as
is re<"ited in the deeds. (16, Am; Juris, p. G53).
It appears that the court concluded that the plaintiffs
were not purchasers for value merely because their deed
and that of their immediate grantor recited a consideration of "One

Doll~r

and Other Good and Valuable Con-

siderations." (R. 47-48, 55). There was no testimony that
value was not in fact paid. The c1aim of the defendants
that they are entitled to rely upon the representations
allegedly made by Penrod and others was that they had
acquired property in 1943 (Ex. 10) from James :Mikkelsen, who was one of the persons present at the meeting
of the County Commissioners on June 3, 1940. It is interesHng to note that this deed (Ex. 10) quotes a consideration of ''One Dollar and other valuable· consideration.''
It is difficult to understand why the one dollar and other
valuable considerations recited in that deed should be
considered as a valuable consideration which would establish such documents as one upon which the defendants
could rely and the one dollar and other valuable considerations recited in the deed unde;r which the plaintiffs
claim should be considered by the court, without any evidence whatsoever, to be not a valuable consideration.
With regard to the question of notice of the claims of the
defendants, we have referred to that hereinabove.
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III.
The findings of fact do not SU]Jiplorf the conclusions of
Law o.r the Decree.

The court failed to make findings on all of the material issues involved in this case. By the complaint of
the plaintiffs it was alleged that: ''The plaintiffs as such
partnership are the owners in fee simple of the subject
property.'' The court made no finding whatsoever on
the question of the plaintiffs' ownership of the property.
The onl)~ finding made was with regard to a claimed estoppel as against the plaintiffs in asserting title against
the defendants. It is our contention that such is not a
sufficient finding upon the material issue as to plaintiffs'
ownership.
This court has held in many cases that in a case tried
to the court without a jury the court must find on every
issue, either affirmatively or negatively as the eviden0e
may be, and thus give the defeated party an opportunity
to assail the finding as not being supported by the evidence and that a failure to find on any material issue is
reversable error. Thomas vs Clayvon P~ano Company, 47
Ut. 191; 151 Pac. 543. Mendelson vs. Roland, 66 Ut. 487:
243 Pac. 798. Prows vs. Hawley, 72 Ut. 444; 271 Pac. 31.
West vs. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Ut. 300; 17 Pac. (2) 292.
Finding No. 15 ( T. 54) of the court referred to the
purported statements and representations of 0. A. Penrod on June 3, 1940 when a committee of residents of Elberta and vicinity waited upon the Utah County ComSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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n11sswners, such statements purporting to have been to
the effect that Penrod and his associates had bought all
the lands from Utah County that they wanted and that
the people living in and about Elberta could go ahead
and huy the balance of the land that had been sold to
Penrod by the Colorado Development Company and
which had been sold to Utah County for non-payment of
taxes. There is no evidence whatsoever that Penrod was
associated with the plaintiffs or their immediate grantors
at the time of the making of the statements attributed to
him under date of June 3, 1940 and no evidence whatsoever that the plaintiffs or any of them or their grantors
knew of such statements or in any way acquiesced or
joined therein. Even if they knew of the statements having been made there is nothing to indicate that by "his
associa:tes'' Penrod referred to the plaintiffs or any of
them and even if they knew of such statements they
would have had no reason to believe that Penrod intended
to refer to them.
As a matter of fact it was never testified that Penrod ever referred to his ''associates'' as the court found.
What he allegedly said was that he and his "partners,
or "~orkers'' had all the land they now desire. (T. 39).
Certain])! there was nO'thing to tie any plaintiff in as a
''partner'' or ''worker'' of Penrod.
With regard to Finding No. 16 there is no evidence
whatsoever to support such a finding. Nowhere can it be
found from the evidence that Penrod dealt with P. P.
Thomas, Max Thomas or Joseph Hanson or any of them
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or any of the plaintiffs with regard to the land in quest[on
subsequent to the tin1e Penrod deeded the land to plaintiffs' iJ:nmediate g-rantor on January 11, 1938. (Exhibit
"H"). Even if there were anything· to indicate that P. P.
Thoma~. :J[ax Thon1as and Joseph Hanson were dealing
with Penrod and the people of Elberta and with Utah
County in respert to these lands (which evidence is not
in the record) it could not be concluded therefrom that
Penrod was a partner of or so associated with the plaintiffs or any of them so that Penrod's statements or activities would bind the plaintiffs or put them on notice of
anything.
Even if perchance there were some evidence in the
record that the plaintiffs at the time of taking the title
had through some ~ource learned that the defendants'
claiJ:ned an interest in the land what difference would this
make where they also had information ,that such claims
were invalid and had no legal force~ They owed no obligation to defendants to protect defendants' interests. So
far as the record shows they paid a valuable consideration for the land and if the defendants contended that
there was no valuable consideration paid the burden was
on the defendants to show 'this. No evidence was introduced or offered for such purpose.
In regard to Finding No. 18 quoted above on page 13
such certainly is not a finding of fact which might properly sup1port any conclusion of law or decree. No. 18
is purely a conclusion of law. What'' evidence constituting
equitable estoppel'' does the court refer

to~

It is. a well
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recognized principle of law that findings must be sufficiently specific and certain as to ascertain just what is
found and decided, without resorting to the evidence or
the pleadings. Doe vs. Doe, 48 Ut. 200; 158 Pac. 781;
Prows vs. Ila:tdey, 72 Ut. 444, 450; 271 Pac. 31. Certainly
Finding No. 18 does not meet such requirement. It would
be in1possible to make any conclusion of law from the
broad general statmnent referred to in Finding No. 18
because we would have to go to the transcript of the evidence to try to determine what facts constituting equitable estoppel were referred to by the court and in that
connection we would have no way of determining which
evidence and which facts the court referred to thereby.
III. (a)
There was no competent evidence sufficient to raise an estoppel in defendants' favor and to thus prevent
plaintiffs from asserting claim to the subject prope.rty or to estop pZai.ntiffs frrom attacking the validity of defendants' title.
The courts decision and judgment in favor of the
defendants was based entirely upon the conclusion of the
1

court that the plaintiffs were estopped to claim the land
1

or, to put it differently, that there were facts constituting
an equitable estoppel in favor of the defendants so as
to prohibit the plaintiffs fron1 asserting the validity of
defendants' tax title. The question of estoppel was set
up by the defendants in two causes of counterclaim. The
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fir~t ~nrh

counterclailu wa~ to the effeet that Penrod
bought the lands in question frmn the Colorado Development Company; that the Con1mercial Bank of Spanish
Fork, h~- P. P. Thon1a~. its president, advanced the pur.
chase nwney : that both a.greed to convey to ·the users
of water the lands purchased upon the water users payment of $2500.00 which payment the water users made
and as son1e of 8UCh water users the defendants became
entitled to the conveyance. If we conclude that there was
sufficient evidence to support such contention then in
any event the most we have is a verbal promise by Penrod and the Commercial Bank through its president that
the defendants would be entitled to a conveyance of real
property. In the first place any evidence with regard to
such matter was inadmissible and should not have been
permitted because it was in contravention of the statute
of frauds. The verbal promise, to convey the land could
not be enforced by reason of the statute of frauds, but in
any event the most that ever was alleged or proven was
that there was an unfullfilled promise to make a conveyance of real property. None of the elements of equitable
estoppel were involved in connection with such matter
and such principle could not be invoked with regard
thereto.
With regard to the other cause of counterclaim of the
defendants the only thing of any substance whatsoever
and the thing upon which the court seems to base its
determination of equitable estoppel was the representations allegedly made by 0. A. Penrod on June 3, 1940
when a committee of residents of the Elberta vicinity
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waited upon the Utah County Commission and it was
asserted tha:t Penrod made the statement that he and his
associates had bought all of the land from Utah County
that they wanted and that the people living in and about
Elberta could go ahead and buy from the county the balance of the land that had been sold to Penrod by the
Colorado Development Company and which had been
sold to Utah County for non-payment of taxes. The actual testi1nony with regard to what Penrod is alleged to
haYe said at the meeting appears on page 39 of the transcript where in :Mrs. Valeria Bauer testified: "He stated
to me that he and his partners, or workers, I do not know
just ho\v he stated it, that was working with him had all
the land that they now desire; that all those with water
rights had been taken care of and if the people, so desire
they could have all that remained.'' Certainly there was
nothing to show that any of the plaintiffs nor the Commercial Bank was "partner" or "worker" of Penrod or
was "working with" Penrod.
In this connection it should be borne in mind that
the property in controversy was transferred from Penrod to the Commercial Bank of Spanish Fork by quit
claim deed dated January 11, 1938. Hence at the time
of the alleged representa;tions and activities of Penrod
on June 3, 1940 he did not have legal title to the property
in controversy. The doctrine of promissory estoppel, according to all of the authorities, is applied only in cases
of promises or representations as to an intended abandonment of an existing right. (19Am. Jur. 658). This
court has recognized the limitation of application of this
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doctrine in the case of Elliott rs. Whitmore, 23 Ut. 342
at 35-J. as follows:

•· * * * Even taking these conversations in
the most favorable view for appellant, there was
absolutely no statement upon the part of the defendants of an intended abandonrnent of an existing right * * *. It has frequently been held that
an estoppel will not arise simply fron1 a breach of
promise as to future conduct, or from a mere
disappointment of expectations. The only case
in which a representation as to the future can be
held to operate as an estoppel is where it relates
to an intended abandonment of an existing right..''
.l~

1_:

With this rule of law in mind let us examine the
facts as established by the evidence most favorable to
the defendants and appellees. The plaintiffs' immediate
grantor received the property in question by quit claim
deed from 0. A. Penrod and wife to the Commercial Bank
of Spanish Fork, said deed being dated the 11th day of
January, 1938. (Exhibt "H"). Subsequent to that time,
so far as the record shows, Penrod never had any interest
in the property in question. No where in the record is
there anything to show, or from which an inference might
be drawn, that the Commercial Bank oi Spanish Fork
or for that matter any of the plaintiffs subsequent to such
transfer had any dealing with Penrod in conne·ction with
any project relating to the ownership of this property.
Inasmuch as Penrod had no interest or title in the
land in question, in so far as anything in the record appears, and so far as appears had no authority to speak
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for the plaintiffs or plaintiffs' immediate grantor, it
certainly could not be said that Penrod, by his statements
and representations and actions at the meeting on June
3, 1940 intended the abandonment of an existing right.
Penrod had no existing right. He knew he had no existing
right in so far as the lands in question are concerned
because he and his wife had transferred any interest
which he previously had by deed dated the 11th day of
January, 1938, more than two years previous to the time
of said meeting. We, of course, cannot speculate as to
what Penrod's reasons might have been for making the
statements attributed to him. But certainly the plaintiffs
are not bound by anything which Penrod did on that date.
This is not a situation where the acts of the grantor are
binding upon the grantee in connection with representations concerning the title to real property. There certainly is no rule of law which prescribes that a grantee
shall be bound -by the activities or representations of his
grantor made after the time when the grantor has transferred title out of himself. From the time title was transferred out of Penrod his right to make representations
of any kind with regard to the title to the property in
question ceased and any representations which he chose
to make ·thereafter would have no binding force or effect
as against his grantee or the successors of such grantee.
There having been "no existing right" .in Penrod at
the time he made the statements and representations on
June 3, 1940 and there being no evidence whatsoever to
indicate that the plaintiffs or their grantor had authorSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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ized Penrod to speak for them or acquiesced in his having done ~o. there eertainly could not have been present
the neee~~ary ele1nent~ to give rise to a prornissory estoppel. In the first plaee there could not have been on the
part of Penrod an intention to abandon an existing right
in connection with any representations made, and even
if there had been, ~ueh could not have extended to and
bound the plaintiffs or plaintiffs' in1mediate grantor.

rm

,·
l·'

The state1nent attributable to Penrod at the meeting
of June 3, 1940 and concerning which the witness Vale ria
Bauer (T. 39) and the witness Earl Barney (T. 50) testified to wa::; objected to as hearsay. Not only were none
of the plaintiffs present at the meeting when such statement was allegedly made but niether were ;the defendants Oren E. or Thelma Barney present. The defendants, the Barneys, were not residents of nor were they
propert~· owners in the vicinity of Elberta at or during
an~· of the time the representations were allegedly made
or activities carried on which they claim constituted an estoppel as against the plaintiffs (T. 64). They did not
·acquire their first property in that vicinity until N ovember 13, 1940. (T. 50 and Ex. 9). Certainly none of the representations referred to were made to the defendants and
they had no right or reason to rely upon the· same.
Even if there were representations made which
might otherwise constitute an equitable estoppel (which
was not established), nevertheless the defendants could
not take advantage of such representations if they were
not the persons to whom such representations were m'ade,
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or at least of the class to which the representations were
made. In ·this case they were neither.
As s.tated in 19 American Juris, page 645 : ''An admission or statement will not work an estoppel if it was
addressed to and designed soley for the information of
another and was not intended to influence the conduct
of the person who claims the estoppel.'' See also Kimmey
vs. Whiton, 44 Conn. ?62, and Bell vs. The Maccabees 82
S. W. 2nd 229.
The on'ly evidence at all that the defendants, the Barneys, ever knew of any of the alleged representations
upon which they rely for an estoppel was the inadmissible hearsay upon hearsay which was brought out from
the defendant, Oren E. Barney, while he was testifying as
a witness. At page 65 of the transcript the following appears:

"Q.

Did you have any conversation with your
father with respect to this land~

A.

I did.

Q.

Prior to your making the

A.

Right.

Q.

Did he make any statement to you with respect to any s.tatement that had previously
been m·ade by Mr. Penrod to hims·elf or any

purchase~

group~

Mr. Anderson: Just a moment. We object to
that as calling for a conclusion of the witness.
The Court: That objection is overruled.
Q.

You may answer.
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A.

He did.

Q. 'Vl1a t did he ~ay?
)[r. Anderson: Just a moment. Wish our
general objection to go to this; and .further,
that it is hearsay * * * ''
''The Court: Yes. You may proceed.
Q.

(By ~Ir. Worthen) Had you had correspondence with your father with respect to this
land¥

A.

Not this particular piece.

Q. But I mean with respect to the land out there.
A.

The land out there, yes. He said it was up for
sale the county had it for sale for county
taxes. And so I sent a money order up to
him with some money to purchase some of
this property. That the piece I had specifically in mind, he said at the time that Penrod
wouldn't turn loose of it for some reason, the
piece of ground I wanted and that he was
holding the money for. So when we come up
in September we got in the car and come over
here to the county auditor, don't recall
whether recorder or auditor, and went through
the records there. Got out the records of land
for sale that the county had for sale out in
that district, and they had this ground here
up for sale at that :time. So I met with the
county commissioners, Mr. Clark and Mr.
Johnson and Mr. Murdock, and told them I
would like to buy that piece of property. And
they wanted to know what offer I would make,
and I asked them what they wanted for the
ground, and they said a dollar an acre. And
I told them all right, I would like to purchase
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it. So I n1ade application to purchase the
ground and ·paid my down payment on the
property at that time.''
It will be observed that the witness was directly
asked and over objection permitted to answer the question as to whether or not his father made any statements
to hin1 with respect to statements previously made by
J\lr. Penrod. The witness in answering such question
never at any time stated what, if anything, he had been
told that Penrod had done or said with regard to the
land. The quoted excerpts from the testimony is the only
thing in the record which would indicate any knowledge
on the part of the defendants, the Barneys, of this alleged representation. There is nothing anywhere to show
that the Barneys ever knew of the represent·ations and
certainly there is nothing to show that at the time they
purchased the tax titles from Utah County they ever
knew of such alleged representations or i£ they did that
they relied upon said representations or if they did so
rely that they thereupon changed their position to their
detriment. With this state of the record we would have
to resort to the highest degree of speculation to conclude
that the defendants, the Barneys, ever knew of the representations or reLied thereon in connection with their
purchase of the property. The whole truth of the matter
is that they did not so rely but mere·ly purchased tax
titles in the regular course of dealing believing that they
were ·complying with the statutes and were buying good
tax titles. When they later learned that the tax titles
1
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sary invent son1e means of endeavoring to defe'at the good
and valid title of the plaintiffs. It is obviou's from the
record that at the tin1e the defendants, the Barneys, purchased the tax titles frmn Utah County they did not know
of nor did they have in mind any representations with
regard to sue.h property, or affecting the same, which
might have been 1na.de by Penrod or by any plain:tiff or
any one authorized to speak for the plaintiffs.
Furthermore the record is absolutely void of evidence to indicate that any person under whom the defendants, the Barneys, cl~im any rights in connection with
this property ever relied upon any representations of
the plaintiffs, or anyone authorized to act for them and
upon such reliance changed their position to their detriment.
In fact the defendants have failed entirely to establish any of ;the necessary elements to constitute an equitable estoppel as against the plaintiffs.
Certainly if an estoppel were to be found in favor
of the defendants, the Barneys, it would have to be predicated upon circumstances existing at the time they acquired their interest in the property in controversy, 1that
is on November 3, 1941, because nowhere is it alleged
or rproven that the plaintiffs or Penrod or anyone allegedly in position to act or speak for the plaintiffs did anything or made any representrutions subsequent to that
time on which an estoppel could be predicated. The defendants, the Barneys, were not of the class of people to
whom any of the representations were allegedly made
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and on N ov·ember 3, 1941, such defendants· had not aequired any inte.rest from any person who was of that
class so as to be in a position to claim privity. It was
not until 1943 that the defendants, the Barneys, acquired
some property from Mikkelson (which property was not
that here in controversy) (Ex. 10). They cannot then
rely upon the interest purchased in 1943 to relate back
and affect the purchase by them of the property in controversy some two years before.
They never attended any meeting when any of the
representations were made upon which they rely for estoppel; they were not of the class to whom any of sucll
representations were allegedly made; 1there is no evidence
whatsoever that they ever knew of any such repTesentations when they acquired any of their property or when
they made any purchaHe of tax titles from the county and
certainly therefore it could not be concluded that they relied upon any such representations to their detriment.
CONCLUSION
The sum and substance of the

e~dence

and testi-

mony presented in this case shows that the pl·aintiffs received the title to the land in contr oversy through various
1

deeds, the validity of which are undisputed. The answering defendants, Oren E. Barney and Thelma Barney,
received quit claim deeds from Utah County covering the
property in question which deeds were admittedly invalid. There was no evidence or testimony sufficient to
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raise an equitable estoppel as against the plaintiffs a.nd
in favor of the defendants.
We respectfully submit that the decision of the lower
court should be reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial.

Ill

Respectfully submitted,

P.N.ANDERSON
A. U. MINER
PUGSLEY, HAYES & RAMPTON

Attorneys for

.A~ppellants
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